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 Judicial Corruption is a disgrace to the world of justice and disaster for 
the justice seeker community. The judiciary is the third branch of state 
power after the executive and legislature. The judicial function is as a 
control and a counterweight to both branches of the power so as not to 
fall into arbitrary acts. In other words, the judiciary basically serves to 
implement the principle of checks and balances. However, if the justice 
functioning as a counterweight is actually involved in the vortex of 
judicial corruption that has plagued the judicial institutions, then what 
happens is the absence of justice because the judicial institution becomes 
unqualified and degrades its reputation in the public eye. This will lead 
to a vote of no confidence in the judiciary as a whole and the community 
has the potential to seek justice in other ways that may be done in illegal 
ways. Therefore, it is important to realize quality judiciary by 
organizing institutional aspects, the process of recruitment of 
constitutional justices, and producing decisions containing new legal 
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1.  Introduction  
Several months ago, exactly on March 12, 2018, the world of law was again thrown by 
his 7 (seven) people handed down by judges, clerks, lawyers and private parties by the 
Indonesia Corruption Eradication Commission (hereinafter abbreviated as, KPK)1. The 
                                               
1  KPK was formed based on Law Number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission, the 
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is given the mandate to eradicate corruption in a professional, 
intensive and sustainable manner. The KPK is an independent state institution that carries out its duties and 
authority free from any authority. The Corruption Eradication Commission is not to take over the eradication 
of corruption from existing institutions. Explanation of the law states the role of the KPK as a trigger 
mechanism, which is intended to encourage or as a stimulus so that corruption eradication assistance by 
existing institutions becomes more effective and efficient. Available from: https://www.kpk.go.id/id/tentang-
kpk/sekilas-komisi-pemberantasan-korupsi [Accessed May 2,2019]. 
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coverage of hand-catching (here in after abbreviated as OTT) operations is rife in various 
news media as well as social media. The judicial apparatus that was caught was from 
the Tangerang District Court. Sometimes, they often shares with certain parties to take 
the benefit of the case that being handled in the judiciary. In fact, at the end of 2017, the 
Chief of Manado High Court, North Sulawesi and a corruption judge (corrupt) judge of  
Bengkulu were also caught in hand-catching operations. Not long ago, this month back 
the judicial apparatus in Tangerang netted OTT operation along with unpredictable 
litigants. 
The rise of OTT events by the KPK to the judicial apparatus makes the legal world 
gloomy in our country. The dignity of the judiciary become cheap goods that are often 
sold on the black market. Judicial corruption increasingly appears to be systemically 
infecting the world of justice. Reasonable in 2014, Sebastian Pompe,2 published a book 
entitled, "The Collapse of the Supreme Court Institution". In summary, Pompe reviews 
institutional failures, and comparative studies of judicial bodies. At the same time, it is 
an extraordinary history of the Supreme Court and the tremendous effort to seek the 
causes of its decline toward corruption and dependence, which involuntarily involves 
the entire civil justice system. Judicial corruption turned out not only to override the 
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court had once tripped a case of judicial corruption 
involving the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court at the time of handling the dispute 
over the election results. In early 2017 there was an OTT event against one of the 
constitutional judges on a judicial review case of a law. Even the employee and the 
security of the Constitutional Court were handed over to the authorities due to selling 
copies of the petition to be examined in the hearing. The absence of a mechanism 
requiring that an application file be immediately downloaded on the Constitutional 
Court page becomes a legal loophole in this case. 
In general, the judicial corruption mode leads to the efforts of the parties to influence 
judgment. The verdict that should be the crown of a judicial institution, often traded 
cheaply. Judicial corruption like a potentially decaying cancer of the judicial institution 
from within. If the judicial institution has been infected with this acute illness, then 
finally the attitude of distrust to the judicial institution will arise. The implications of a 
court that loses its dignity culminate in the potential rise of street justice in which people 
will seek justice based on their own way. This is certainly very dangerous if allowed to 
drag on. 
On the other hand, the role of the Constitutional Court is very strategic in examining, 
adjudicating and deciding constitutional cases that often position parties from other 
branches of power in trials, such as the President and the House of Representatives as 
providers in the examination of laws or political parties in disputes election results is a 
vulnerable point and prone to intervene on the Constitutional Court. Not to mention the 
other temptations that are getting stronger and trying to infiltrate the Constitutional 
Court in order to influence the decision. Many parties are finally aware of the strategic 
position of the Constitutional Court. Therefore, efforts to maintain the courts of justice 
need to be done while mapping and closing the potential of open gaps of corruption. 
This paper will discuss several problems, namely about a brief portrait of the 
independence of the judiciary in Indonesia. Second, the discussion will be approved 
when waiting to be approved by the Constitutional Court as a modern court and can be 
trusted through a professional judicial manager. Third, the discussion will emphasize 
                                               
2  Sebastian Pompe. (2012). Runtuhnya Institusi Mahkamah Agung. Jakarta: Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi untuk 
Independensi Peradilan,p.12-13. 
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the approval of an independent and independent court of ethics council. Fourth, the 
discussion will discuss the pattern of recruitment of judges who also influence the level 
of independence of judges. Fifth, legal issues that are discussed are related to decisions 
that have become historic decisions and are the result of quality judicial implementation. 
 
2. A Brief Portrait of Judicial Independence  
Judicial independence is closely related to the idea of conflict resolution by third parties. 
In other words, a person trusted to settle a controversy after considering the facts and 
their connection with the relevant law or idea which affirms that the dispute must be 
settled by a judge who has no connection with the Petitioner and has no interest in a 
case.3 According to Becker,4 judicial independence is: 
a. The degree to which judges...decide [cases] consistent with...their interpretation of law; 
b. In opposition to what others, who are perceived to have political or judicial power, think 
about desire in like matters; 
c. Particularly when a decision averse to the beliefs or desires of those with political or 
judicial power may bring some retribution on the judges personally or on the power of 
the court. 
Meanwhile, according to Keith Rosenn, judicial independence as the degree to which 
judges actually decide cases in accordance with their own determinations of the 
evidence, the law and justice, free from corcion, blandishments, interference, or threats 
from governmental authorities or private citizens. 5 Briefly, Joel G. Verner’s brief 
definition of judicial independence as,” the ability to decide cases on the basis of 
established law and the merits of case, without substantial interference from other 
political or governmental agents.6 
Two thirds of the world’s current written constitutions contain some form of explicit 
protection for the independence of the judiciary, and the proportion of constitutional 
documents that contain such protections has been rising over time.7 
According to John Bell, the concept of judicial independence has been seen as a remedy 
to a number of problems. First, some courts have been politicised institution, more like 
an arm of government. The second problem is political influence on judicial decisions, 
either orders to judges or influence on them or on the proprosecution process. Third 
problem encountered in many countries is the political influence over the allocation of 
resources for justice. A fourth problem is political involvement in the selection and career 
progression of judges. If judges are rewarded or penalised because of their political 
leanings, this might well influence the performance of their duties. A final problem is 
the involvement of judges in extra-judicial activities. Some may have political 
implications, such as chairing an inquiry into a sensitive social issue.8There are a number 
of specific issues which illustrate these different concerns, such as management (judicial 
                                               
3  Christopher M. Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoritical and Conceptual Analysis”, 
The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol 44, No.4, Amarican Society of Comparative Law, p.609-610.  
4  Ibid. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid. 
7   David S. Law, Judicial Independence, The International Encyclopedia of Political Science, Vol.5,pp.1369-1372, 
Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Leonardo Morlino, eds., 2011, Washington U. School of Law Working paper No. 
10-02-16. 
8  John Bell. (2001). Judicial Cultures and Judicial Independence. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 4, 
47-60. doi: 10.5235/152888712802761798. 
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independence as self-government, selection and promotions (judicial independence as 
freedom from dependence on political authorities), and freedom from outside pressure 
through their external activities.9 
Our nation has experienced situations where the judiciary is not in an independent 
position. In 1964, Law No. 19 of 1964 on the Basic Provisions of Judicial Power was 
established. In Article 19 stated, "The court is not free from the influence of executive power 
and the power to make laws."10 Especially when the Chief Justice is included as one of the 
ministers in the composition of the cabinet. But in the New Order era, out of Law No. 14 
of 1970 on the Basic Provisions of Judicial Power, one of which the article annulled the 
provisions of Article 19 this. Article 10 paragraph (2) of Law 14/1970 states, "The 
Supreme Court is the highest state court".11 That is, other power interventions against 
the judiciary try to be reduced. According to Article 10 Paragraph (1) of Law 14/1970, 
judicial power is exercised by courts within the General Courts, Religious Courts, 
Military Courts and Administrative Courts. However, Article 11 of Law 14/1970 
actually positioned the judiciary, namely the general courts, religious courts, military 
court and state administrative court under the authority of the department concerned in 
terms of its organization, its administration and its finances. Article 11 of Law 14/1970 
states, "The judicial bodies mentioned in Article 10 paragraph (1), administrative, 
administrative, and financial are under the control of each Department concerned."12 
While the Supreme Court has its own organization, administration and finance. 
That is, the construction of Article 11 of Law 14/1970 when considered, then this article 
re-establishes judiciaries under the executive, although it is confined to the 
organizational, administrative and financial aspects only. With this position, the 
judiciary is no less vulnerable to intervention. This is also the concern of Asnawi Latif 
from the Fraction of the Union of Daulatul Ummah (F-PDU) in the PAH III Meeting of 
the MPR 1999 during the process of amendment to the 1945 Constitution which 
proposed the judicial institutions under one roof, namely MA. Here's his opinion.13 
"[To] an increase in the authority of the judiciary, as we have proposed yesterday, so that 
the judiciary, all judicial and judicial institutions, is in one roof, the Supreme Court, both 
professionally and administratively. During the legs of the judges, one roof in the 
Supreme Court, one roof in the Department of Justice, the same as the highest and highest 
institutions of the country, we MPR, but the budget in Setneg. " 
This has the potential to affect the independence of the judiciary in general. Therefore, 
when the momentum of constitutional change (Table 1). When observed, after the 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the assertion that judicial power is an independent 
power is explicitly stated in the editorial of Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution after the 
amendment. The phrase "freedom" contains basic principles in the world of justice, 
including the principles of independence, the principle of impartiality, and the principle 
of integrity. This means that the institution of the judicial authorities post-1945 
amendment is designed to be independent and independent from the influence of any 
power. This is consistent with the original intent interpretation of Article 24 of the 1945 
                                               
9  Ibid. 
10  Article 19 of Law No. 19 of 1964. 
11  Article 10 (2) of Law No. 14 of 1970. 
12  Article 11 of Law No. 14 of 1970. 
13  Wiwik Budi Wasitoetc, Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan UUD 1945: Latar Belakang, Proses, dan Hasil 
Pembahasan 1999-2002, Buku VI tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman, (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan 
Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2010), 38. 
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Constitution after the changes that mean the judicial power is an independent power, as 
stated by one of the members of PAH I BP MPR, Agun G. Sudarsa from Golkar Party 
Faction when discussing about the judicial power as follows.14 
"The exercise of judicial power is exercised through a free and impartial judicial process, 
accessible and quick from investigation, investigation, prosecution, termination to 
implementation ..." 
The existence of independent and independent judiciary actors was also mentioned by 
Ali Marwan Hanan from the PPP Party who delivered the following.15 
"... Judicial power is an independent and independent power and independent of the 
influence of other state power, any interference either directly or indirectly to the judicial 
authorities is prohibited ...". 
Table 1. Comparison Between Article 24 Before and After Constitution Amendment 
 
Parag. Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution Before Amendment Parag. 
Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution After 
Amendment 
(1) The power of the judiciary is carried 
out by a Supreme Court and other 
judicial bodies according to the law. 
 
(1) Judicial power is an independent power to 
administer justice in order to uphold law and 
justice. 
 
(2) The structure and powers of the 
judicial bodies are regulated by law 
(2) Judicial power is exercised by a Supreme 
Court and the lower courts within the general 
judiciary, the jurisdiction of the judiciary, the 
military court environment, the 
administrative court of the state, and by a 
Constitutional Court. 
 
(3) Other bodies whose functions relate to 
judicial power are regulated in law. 
 
Source: Primary data, 2018. 
 
As a result, in Article 3 of the Judicial Authority Law 2009 is explicitly and clearly stated 
that the basic character of the judiciary in deciding cases is independent and 
independent. Even in the provisions of paragraph (3) of the Judicial Power Law of 2009, 
a person who deliberately intervenes in judicial matters is punishable by a criminal 
penalty. However, paragraph (2) contains exceptions to this provision as long as it is 
intended in the 1945 Constitution. This is reasoned because within the Supreme Court, 
KY serves as an external supervisor based on Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution having 
authority in the framework of proposing candidates for Supreme Court Justices and in 
order to preserve the nobility and the dignity of the judge. The provision of Article 24B 
of the 1945 Constitution seems to indicate that KY interfered in the pattern of recruitment 
of Supreme Court justices and its supervision, making it appear that the Supreme Court 
was not free. However, it is not interpreted as KY's interference with the Supreme Court 
because in principle the Supreme Court has an absolute independence in deciding the 
case of its authority. 
 
                                               
14  Wiwik Budi Wasito. etc. Op.Cit., p. 115. 
15  Ibid,118. 
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From a theoretical perspective, Montesque once said that judicial power needs to be 
separated from the legislative and executive powers, because if the legislative power is 
not separated from the judicial power the judge has no freedom in completing his 
judicial duties in examining, hearing and deciding cases. The freedom of life and 
freedom of the subject will be subject to arbitrary control, because the judge will then 
become a legislator. If the judge is not separated from the executive power, the judge 
will be easy to commit violence and act arbitrarily. Hence, Montesque's opinion is related 
to the importance of separation of judicial power separated from the influence of the 
legislative and executive powers, "... there is no liberty, if the judiciary power is not 
separated from the legislature and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the live 
and the liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would 
then be legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with 
violence and oppression ".16 
On the other hand, the result of the amendment of Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution 
gave birth to a new state institution, namely the Judicial Commission (hereinafter, KY) 
and the Constitutional Court (hereinafter referred to as the Constitutional Court). The 
birth of KY was motivated by negative image of MA at that time which was thick with 
the scent of judicial corruption and the number of cases arrears, so it came an idea to 
have an institution authorized to supervise the Supreme Court.17 
Furthermore, the spirit to make the institution of the perpetrators of judicial power as an 
independent institution contained in Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution then becomes 
the spirit in the change of Judicial Power Law. In Article 3 of Law Number 48 Year 2009 
regarding Judicial Power, it is stated as follows.18 
(1)  In carrying out its duties and functions, judges and constitutional judges are required 
to maintain judicial independence. 
(2)  Any interference in judicial matters by any other party outside the judicial authority 
is prohibited except in matters referred to in the 1945 Constitution of the State of the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
(3)  Any person who knowingly violates the provisions referred to in paragraph (2) shall 
be liable in accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations. 
KY's authority was not spared in the discussion of the trial of PAH I BP MPR. At the 41st 
Meeting of the PAH I of the People's Consultative Assembly, on June 8, 2000, Agun G. 
Sudarsa from the Golkar Party Faction conveyed his fraction's views regarding the need 
for the existence of KY as follows.  
"The Supreme Court established the Judicial Commission to provide recommendations to 
the MPR on the appointment and dismissal, including the supervision of Supreme Court 
Justices, whose membership consists of former Supreme Court Justices, legal practitioners, 
public figures, religious figures and academics" 
The same thing was also conveyed by I Dewa Gede Palguna from the PDI-Perjuangan 
faction who conveyed the necessity of forming a KY to propose a supreme judge. 
"... in order to avoid the intervention of the executive power of judges, we propose the 
establishment of an independent body we call the Judicial Commission at the national and 
local levels, so that if the former Supreme Court is appointed by the President and the 
                                               
16  Daniel E. Brannen Jr, Checks and Balances: The Three Barnces of the American Government, Thomson. p,26. 
17  Wiwik Budi Wasito.etc. Op.Cit., 
18  Article 3 of Law Number 48 Year 2009 
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judges are appointed by the Minister of Justice, proposed for Supreme Court Justices to be 
appointed by the President, based on the proposal of the National Judicial Commission. 
And for ordinary judges, meaning outside the Supreme Court, appointed by the President 
under the Regional Judicial Commission. " 
In the end, the third amendment is also agreed in the Plenary Session that the Judicial 
Commission has the authority as regulated in Article 24B paragraph (1) of the 1945 
Constitution which states, "The Judicial Commission is independent which has the 
authority to propose the appointment of the Supreme Court and has other authority in 
order to maintain and uphold the honor, the dignity of dignity, and the behavior of 
judges." 
On the other hand, there are new challenges facing the judiciary to maintain its 
independence. After the constitutional amendment which succeeded in making 
fundamental changes because of putting the position of religious court, military court, 
and state administrative court in one roof, namely in the Supreme Court, new problems 
arise related to the independence of judges. It turns out that a higher court official can 
also influence the independence of the lower courts. This is based on research results 
conducted by Indonesia Legal Roundtable (ILR).19 
Table 2. The Parties that Most Affect the Judges of 2016 
 
Party Very Often Often Quite Often Infrequently Never 
The Local Government 17.50 12.50 30.00 22.50 17.50 
Members of parlement 5.00 30.00 25.00 27.50 12.50 
Political Party 10.00 27.50 25.00 25.00 12.50 
Public Figures 7.50 10.00 20.00 52.50 10.00 
Advocat 20.00 32.50 25.00 17.50 5.00 
The Mass Organizations 17.50 17.50 22.50 32.50 10.00 
Entrepreneur 32.50 25.00 17.50 17.50 7.50 
Higher  Court Officials 22.50 10.00 35.00 25.00 7.50 
 
Source: Indonesia Legal Roundtable, 2017. 
 
From the Table 2, it can be concluded that there are three parties that influence 
predominantly on the judicial independency successively, i.e. employers (32.50%), high 
court officials (22.50%), and community organizations (17.50%). Therefore, to maintain 
the independence of the judiciary requires a genuine effort to establish a transparent and 
accountable judicial system and reduce direct contact with the litigants. Direct contact 
with the parties can be reduced by establishing an information technology-based justice 
system. 
 
3.  Keeping the Rhythm as a Modern and Reliable Judicature 
The Constitutional Court was born in the 3rd amendment in the process of amendment 
to the 1945 Constitution. The birth of the Constitutional Court is not only to ensure that 
there is no legal product that contradicts the constitution as the supreme law, but also as 
a means of strengthening the mechanism of mutual balance and checks and balances 
                                               
19  Indonesia Legal Roundtable, Indeks Negara Hukum Indonesia, Jakarta, 2017, 40. 
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between branch of state power so as to minimize abuse of power, because according to 
Lord Acton, "power tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupt absolutely,". 
Based on Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution it has been determined that 
the Constitutional Court has four constitutional authorities and one constitutional 
obligation. Article 10 Paragraph (1) Sub-Paragraph a through d of Law Number 24 Year 
2003 juncto Law Number 8 Year 2011 regarding the Constitutional Court (Law on the 
Constitutional Court) reinforces the provision by mentioning the four authorities of the 
Constitutional Court, namely: 
a. To examine the law against the 1945 Constitution; 
b. To decide upon disputes of authority among state institutions whose authorities 
are granted by the 1945 Constitution; 
c. To break the dissolution of political parties; 
d. Disconnecting disputes about election results. 
Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 7A and Article 7B Paragraph (1) to Paragraph (5) and 
Article 24C Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution which is then reaffirmed in Article 10 
paragraph (2) of the Constitutional Court Law, the Constitutional Court has an 
obligation to make the opinion of the People's Legislative Assembly that the President 
and / or Vice President have committed a violation of law, or a disgraceful act, or do not 
qualify as President and / or Vice President as referred to in the 1945 Constitution. In 
addition to having four powers and duties, the Constitutional Court also has a function 
which is a derivation of the guardian of constitution, the final interpreter of constitution, 
the guardian of democracy, the protector of citizen's constitutional right, the protector 
of human rights man (the protector of human rights). 
In its development, the Constitutional Court's authority in deciding the dispute over 
election results was extended not only to the General Elections of DPR, DPD and DPRD 
members as well as to the Presidential Election, but also to decide disputes over the 
results of the general elections of regional heads. Under article 236C of the Regional 
Government Law that the handling of disputes over vote count results of regional head 
and deputy regional head elections by the Supreme Court shall be transferred to the 
Constitutional Court at the latest 18 (eighteen) months since the Act is enacted. With the 
enactment of the article, dispute resolution of local election shall become the authority 
of the Constitutional Court and local election to be part of the election legal regime. 
Furthermore, through Decision Number 97/PUU-XI/2013, the Constitutional Court has 
canceled and stated that Article 236C of the Regional Government Law does not have a 
null and void law. Therefore, the Constitutional Court is no longer authorized to 
adjudicate disputes over the results of regional head elections. According to the 
Constitutional Court, based on the original intent interpretation, basically the authority 
of the state institution which is clearly and explicitly described in the 1945 Constitution 
is limitative so that it is impossible given another authority. Moreover, the other 
authority is granted by legislation that is hierarchically level under the constitution.  
Therefore, from this perspective, the authority of the Constitutional Court is also 
limitative so that it can not be, local election is not the authority of the Constitutional 
Court. However, as long as there is no special court to adjudicate the dispute over the 
results of the Regional Head Elections, the Constitutional Court still has the authority to 
adjudicate the disputes over the results of the Regional Head Elections. Even the 
authority of the Constitutional Court in adjudicating disputes over the results of regional 
head elections in the transitional period before the establishment of a special judicial 
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body, currently has been contained in Article 157 paragraph (3) Law No. 10 of 2016 on 
the Second Amendment to Law No. 1 of 2015 on Determination Government Regulation 
in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2014 on the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors Become 
Act. 
The Constitutional Court as the judiciary of today is required to always improve itself in 
order to follow the present trend. Moreover, the Constitutional Court has a vision, 
"Guarding the uprightness of the Constitution through a modern and reliable 
Constitutional Court." In this context, the word "modern" has two meanings, namely 
modern in the sense of the mindset and modern in the technological sense. Modern in 
the sense of mindset affirms that the current judicial management is professionally 
managed, accountable and transparent by reflecting the needs of the justice seeker 
community, so that the best service can be provided. Meanwhile, "modern" in the sense 
of technology implies the meaning that the management of public administration and 
judicial administration and service to society must be packed through a technological 
approach that facilitates access to justice and justices. This is triggered by the 
development of people's lives that are very fast and dynamic because all the data and 
information is in the touch of the hand through the gadget. Only armed with search 
engines on google apps, all references, data, and information we can get. This is certainly 
a challenge for the court and the secretariat general of the Constitutional Court in 
realizing the vision of the Constitutional Court. 
Since 2008, the Court has conducted long-distance trials through the use of video 
conferencing (vicon). With the vicon technology, it is possible for the justice seekers to 
follow the trial of the Constitutional Court without coming to Jakarta. The verification 
and attendance value of the parties examined through the vicon equipment is the same 
as the presence in the courtroom in Jakarta. The pattern of long-distance trial conducted 
by the Court to facilitate access of justice seekers to the judiciary (access to court and 
justice) considering the location of the Constitutional Court which is only in Jakarta, as 
the capital of the country. 
In order to facilitate the public to the judiciary, now the Court has developed e-Case 
application, e-BRPK and tracking cases, so that public access to the proceedings in the 
Constitutional Court can always be followed its development. The public can also 
monitor the trial in the Constitutional Court through live streaming available on the 
Court page. Not only that, present trial treatises can be accessed not only in written form 
but also in the form of audio formats. Of course, this effort is done to increase confidence 
that the implementation of the trial in the Constitutional Court is open. Currently the 
Court is very concerned about developing and continually improving ICT-based judicial 
management system. This is a form of accountability and transparency of the 
Constitutional Court to the public and efforts in improving excellent service to the 
public. 
On the other hand, for 15 years, many achievements have been made by the Court 
among others. 
1. Maintaining Unqualified Exception (WTP) in a financial manager for 10 (ten) 
consecutive years. This is a manifestation of the Court's financial reporting that 
is managed professionally, transparently, accountably, effectively and efficiently. 
2. Maintaining the value of Government Institution Performance Accountability 
System (SAKIP) with a very good predicate. 
3. Obtained Bawaslu Awards from Bawaslu RI because the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Indonesia is deemed to have contributed in realizing the elections 
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of quality, integrity, dignity and democratic and many achievements, 
achievements, and other awards can not be mentioned one by one. 
Meanwhile, in addition to achievements, to uphold the independence of a credible 
judicial institution, the Constitutional Court has done a lot of introspection and internal 
improvement. In order to maintain integrity and professionalism, the constitutional 
judges and all ranks in the Registrar's Office and the Secretariat General of the 
Constitutional Court are committed together to achieve the following: 
1. Strengthening the supervision system and maintaining the integrity of 
constitutional justices and all officials and employees in the Court environment. 
2. Increase professionalism in the process of handling cases and acceleration of 
settlement of cases that rely on the quality of the Court's decision to maintain, 
given the verdict is the judicial crown. 
3. To open the widest public access to the case being examined by the 
Constitutional Court through an ICT-based information system. 
These efforts are conducted solely as a manifestation of awareness to realize the 
constitutionality of Indonesia through the implementation of the constitutional duties of 
the Constitutional Court towards a better nation and state based on the 1945 
Constitution. 
Meanwhile, based on data on the Registrar's Office and the Secretariat General of the 
Constitutional Court, the achievement of the case which became the core business of the 
Constitutional Court since its establishment in 2003 is as follows.20 
1. Since its establishment in 2003 until 2017, the Court has registered as many as 
2,481 cases consisting of the judicial review of 1,134 cases, the local election as 
many as 910 cases, Legislative Election Result Dispute as much as 412 cases, and 
25 cases of dispute authorities among state institution. 
2. Of all cases, 2,432 cases have been terminated with details of 376 cases granted, 
1,107 cases rejected, 762 cases unacceptable, 20 cases dropped, 147 cases 
withdrawn by the Petitioners, 13 cases of follow-up of interlocutory decision and 
7 cases declaring the court is not authorized. 
3. Based on data recorded by the Court Clerk, cases of judicial review handled by 
the Constitutional Court from 2003 to 2017 were 1,134 cases and had been 
decided as many as 1,085 cases with details based on the verdict of 244 cases 
granted, 379 cases rejected, 325 cases not received, 20 cases of death, 110 cases 
withdrawn, and against the 7 cases Court declared not authorized. While the 
remaining 49 cases of judicial review is still being followed by the process of 
examination in 2018. 
4. Throughout 2017, cases of judicial review registered by the Court's Registry of 
102 cases and the remaining cases in 2016 amounted to 78 cases, so the total cases 
to be decided amounted to 180 cases. Of the 180 cases of judicial review, which 
was successfully terminated until the end of 2017 were 131 cases. Thereby, 49 
cases continue to 2018 and by the beginning of 2018 there are 12 registered law 
enforcement cases, so the total cases in progress until the beginning of this year 
(Per Feb. 15, 2018) amount to 61 cases. 
 
                                               
20  The Annual Report of the Constitutional Court of  2017. 
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On the other hand, in its efforts to become a qualified judiciary, the Court has adopted 
the International Framework for Court Excellent (IFCE) in exercising its authority. 
Primarily this is done by the Registrar and the General Secretariat as the main supporting 
the Constitutional Court in performing its duties and constitutional authority. IFCE is 
an instrument that can be used as a reference for the judiciary in order to realize the 
judicial institution to be court excellent, so trusted by the public in the search for justice. 
To be a court of justice the IFCE instruments according to the instrument must be met is 
how to internalize the principles of justice. The principles of the judiciary are:21 
a. Equality before the law; 
b. Fairness; 
c. Impartiality; 







Those core values guarantee due process and equal protection of the law to all those who 
have business before the courts. They also set court culture and provide direction for all 
judges and staff for a proper functioning court.22 Meanwhile, 7 (seven) areas where the 
application of these values are: 
a. Court Management and Leadership; 
b. Court Policies; 
c. Human, Material, and Financial Resources; 
d. Court Proceedings; 
e. Clients’ Needs and Satisfaction; 
f. Affordable and Accessible Court Services; 
g. Public Trust and Confidence. 
The result of applying the universal principles of justice into these seven trials will result 
in a quality judiciary, so that public confidence in the judiciary will increase and the 
prime service of the judiciary to the public can always be given. This is what the MK is 
currently doing. 
 
4.  Integrity of Constitutional Justices 
Meanwhile, the design of supervision on the Constitutional Court is different from KY. 
Based on the original intent interpretation of Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution and the 
Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 005 / PUU-IV / 2006, the Constitutional 
Court is not the object of supervision of KY. The design of the Constitutional Court's 
supervision is based on Article 27A of the Constitutional Court Law, namely by 
establishing the Honorary Council of the Constitutional Court. However, in line with 
the development of the period, the Constitutional Court has been established as a 
permanent institution in charge of day to day to maintain the integrity of constitutional 
                                               
21  International Framework For Court Excellent.(2013). http://www.courtexcellence.com/~/media 
/Microsites/Files/ICCE/The%20International%20Framework%202E%202014%20V3.ashx.[accessed 
May,2019] 
22  Ibid. 
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justices. While the Honorary Board is an ad hoc institution in the form of temporary. 
Although the design between supervision of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional 
Court is different, in principle, even the institution of judicial authority needs an 
institution that guards and supervises it. 
The reason why KY can not supervise the Constitutional Court is based on Decision 
Number 005 / PUU-IV / 2006 dated 23 August 2006 and Decision Number 1-2 / PUU-
XII / 2014, dated 13 February 2014, where the Constitutional Court has decided that the 
Constitutional Court Judge related to KY which is authorized under Article 24B of the 
1945 Constitution. Based on these two decisions, there are at least two reasons why KY 
is not designed to "supervise" the Constitutional Court, that is, firstly, based on a 
systematic interpretation of the articles of the Constitution. The position of the Judicial 
Commission is in Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution, while the Supreme Court is in 
Article 24A of the 1945 Constitution and the Constitutional Court's position is in Article 
24C of the 1945 Constitution where the article setting one level is under KY. The existence 
of the positioning arrangements of these articles implies the meaning that KY is designed 
to "supervise" judges in the MA and KY environments not designed to "supervise" the 
Constitutional Court.  
Secondly, to avoid conflict of interest (conflict of interest). If KY is authorized to supervise 
the Constitutional Court, this has the potential to create a conflict of interest when the 
KY is a party to a dispute over the authority of a state institution that is the domain of 
the Constitutional Court's authority. In this condition, the Constitutional Court will be 
"held hostage" because its supervisory agency is a party to the dispute which must be 
decided by it. This clearly has the potential to reduce the independence and impartiality 
of the Constitutional Court as one of the independent judicial authorities based on 
Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution. 
Therefore, the Constitutional Court can not be compelled to be "supervised" by the 
Judicial Commission, because if so, then what happens is a form of legal smuggling 
because it is clearly contradictory to the Decision of the Court Number 005 / PUU-IV / 
2006 and Decision Number 1-2 / PUU-XII / 2014. If external "oversight" is currently 
inadequate, there are several steps to be taken: (i) making the Ethics Council or the 
Honorary Council of Constitutional Justices an independent and independent 
institution authorized to safeguard the integrity of constitutional justices as well as the 
Council of Honor Election Organizer (DKPP) for the General Election Commission 
(KPU) and working day to day; (ii) to amend the 1945 Constitution by placing the 
position of authority of KY after the authority of MA and MK. That is, the position of KY 
should be placed in Article 24C after Article 24A which regulates the MA and Article 
24B regulating the Constitutional Court. In addition, it should also be stated explicitly in 
the amendment of Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution that the object of the authority of 
KY includes also constitutional justices in the Constitutional Court. 
In article 24B of the 1945 Constitution it is affirmed that the Judicial Commission has the 
authority "to uphold and uphold the honor, dignity, and conduct of judges" and not "to 
supervise". The differences in the words "guarding" and "watching" bring different legal 
implications. First, the word "guard" contains a prevention perception, while the word 
"watching" contains perceptions of action; Second, the word "guard" contains 
"coordinative" perceptions, while the word "watching" contains the perception of 
"subordination". Therefore, in the context of the judiciary, the amendments to the 1945 
Constitution dictate that in Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution the chosen is the word 
"guard" as a nomenclature option rather than the word "oversee". 
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The word "guard" is then interpreted by the legislator to be the word "supervise" as set 
forth in Article 20 of Law 22 of 2004 on the Judicial Commission, which states, "In 
exercising the authority referred to in Article 13 letter b the Judicial Commission has the 
task of supervising the behavior of judges in order to uphold the honor and dignity of 
the dignity and maintain the behavior of judges ". This article is then canceled by the 
Constitutional Court because it turns out in practice, the Judicial Commission to oversee 
the behavior of judges through the judgment of the verdict. This is clearly contradictory 
to Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution, the principle of res judicata pro veritatehabetur, and 
the universal principle which states that the court's decision can not be changed except 
through the verdict of the court itself. 
 
5. Pattern of Recruitment of Constitutional Justices 
According to Sri Soemantri, one of the ways to obtain a judge with qualified 
authoritative, honest, fair, and behaving impeccably is to conduct objective recruitment 
patterns of judges.23 There is a close correlation between the pattern of recruitment of 
constitutional justices with the endeavor to realize quality judiciary. Because if the 
pattern of recruitment is wrong, then the result is not a competent constitutional judge. 
Existing current conditions, there is no uniform mechanism between the President, the 
House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court as the proposing state institution 
when selecting candidates for constitutional justices. On several occasions, 
constitutional judges are elected by direct appointment mechanisms. There are also 
elections conducted by internal teams in private. These two mechanisms are certainly 
not in line with transparent and participatory principles, so that the objectivity and 
accountability of the process becomes questionable by the public.24 Although there is 
also a selection conducted by the proposer institution openly, such as the selection 
process of Moh's successor. Mahfud MD and Harjono conducted by Parliament or 
election I Dewa GedePalguna by President Jokowi. 
Based on Article 19 of the Constitutional Court Law, the nomination of constitutional 
judges must meet the transparant and participative principles. The word "transparent" 
implies that the process of recruiting candidates for constitutional justices must be open 
to the public starting from the announcement of the recruitment process, the recruitment 
process, and the outcome of the recruitment process. In addition, all processes must be 
"participatory". That is, in the process required the active involvement of the community 
to assess the track record of the judges of the constitution. This is important to avoid the 
election of a constitutional judge from a candidate who has a negative track record. This 
is also what Moh. Mahfud MD at a public discussion session heard by the Court held by 
the Registrar and the Secretariat General of the Court after the arrest of one of the judges 
of the Constitutional Court in early 2017 due to cases of judicial corruption. In addition 
to being transparent and participatory, the recruitment of constitutional justices must be 
conducted objectively and accountably. 
After the arrest of AM due to judicial corruption case, the President issued Government 
Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 1 of 2013 in response to public pressure. One of 
the reasons is to improve the mechanism of judge selection of constitution. In the 
provisions of Article 18A s.d. Article 18C of the Perppu, the proposing state institution 
                                               
23  Sri Soemantri. (2014). Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia, Bandung: PT.Remaja Rosdakarya, p. 256 
24 Pan Mohamad Faiz. (2017). Mekanisme Seleksi Hakim Konstitusi. Available from 
https://www.academia.edu/31748428/Mekanisme_Seleksi_Hakim_Konstitusi_Koran_SINDO_[accessed 
May,2019]. 
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shall nominate a candidate for constitutional judge to the Panel of Experts established 
by the Judicial Commission. The Panel will conduct a fit and proper test for candidates 
of constitutional justices. In the end, the Perppu is then approved by the House of 
Representatives into Law No. 4 of 2014. 
The Constitutional Court turned out to completely cancel the Act. According to the 
Constitutional Court in its legal considerations, the selection of candidates for 
constitutional justices by the Panel of Experts has reduced, even taken over the 
constitutional authority granted by the 1945 Constitution to the President, the People's 
Legislative Assembly and the Supreme Court. Moreover, the panel of experts set out in 
the Perppu was established by the Judicial Commission. The following quote of the 
Court's decision in paragraph [3.21], p.110 
"Therefore, the formation of Selection Committee or Panel of Experts ever undertaken 
by the President and the House of Representatives should be continued to be an 
initiative of each state agency proposer. The formation of a Committee or Panel such as 
this will be able to reduce the personal interests and the subjectivity of decisions made 
by the President, Member of the Law Commission of the Parliament, or the Supreme 
Court. In addition, each of the proposing state agencies must immediately formulate 
specific internal rules and procedures that remain in line with the selection mechanism 
of constitutional justices. Without clear rules and procedures, the constitutional judicial 
selection mechanism will always change every time following the interests and tastes of 
the proposing agency. " 
 
6. Several Landmark Decisions: Magnet Toward Public Trust 
Since its inception 15 years ago, the Constitutional Court has played an important and 
strategic role and position in the reform of law and constitution in our country. In his 
journey to guard the constitution and democratic process, not infrequently the Court 
issued a decision that became the landmark decisions because in its legal considerations, 
the Constitutional Court considered a sense of substantive justice in the midst of society. 
Although initially the decisions are difficult to accept and considered controversial, but 
then gradually the public increasingly know the meaning, benefits, and reasons behind 
the decisions that were dropped. For example, the Constitutional Court canceled Article 
50 of the Constitutional Court Law related to the limitation of judicial review authority 
only to laws established after the first amendment of the 1945 Constitution (vide 
Decision 066/PUU-II/2004 dated April 12, 2005). Initially this decision had caused 
controversy in some circles of legal observers, but if only the provisions were not 
canceled, it has closed the opportunity of justice seekers (justice seeker) to be able to test 
laws born before the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, such as the Criminal Code, 
Criminal Procedure Code, Correctional Law, Marriage Law, Narcotics Law, Law 
Number 02/Pnps/1964, whereas, for example, there are norms in the law that are in fact 
detrimental to the constitutional rights of citizens and are contradictory to the 
constitution. Therefore, the Constitutional Court canceled Article 50 of the 
Constitutional Court Law. 
Other milestone rulings that changed the way of punishment, such as decisions that 
rehabilitated the rights of former and descendants of PKI members (vide Decision 
Number 011-017/PUU-I/2003 dated February 24, 2004), decisions on the permission of 
independent candidates in local elections (vide Decision Number 5/PUU-V/2007 dated 
July 23, 2007), and the decision on the amendment of the elected candidate counts from 
the serial number to the majority vote (see Decision Number 22-24/PUU-VI /2009 dated 
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December 23, 2008). The decision to allow the use of identity card or passport as a 
condition of voting in the Presidential Election due to technical constraints potentially 
reducing the right of the citizens to vote, the Constitutional Court allows KTP or 
Passport as a condition to be able to vote (vide Decision Number 102/PUU-VII / 2009 
dated July 6, 2009). The verdict limiting the application of the PK only once (vide 
Decision Number 34/PUU-XI/2013 dated March 6, 2014). Decisions on the 
implementation of simultaneous General Election of Presidential Election and General 
Election (vide Decision Number 14/PUU-XI/2013), decisions related to water resources 
management that restore water resource management obligations to the state, while 
private sector only obtains residual authority in the exploitation of resources water (vide 
Decision Number 85/PUU-XI/2013 dated February 18, 2015), a decision involving the 
appointment of a suspect as an object in pre-trial (vide Decision Number 21/PUU-
XII/2014 dated 28 April 2015), award (vide Decision Number 97/PUU-XIV/2016), a 
decision which affirms that the KPK is an independent institution that performs the 
functions executive in law enforcement so that it may be imposed as the object of the 
right of inquiry, but related to law enforcement authority cannot be subject to the right 
of inquiry object (vide Decision 36/PUU-XV/2017). 
Decisions which are the legal basis are composed of the opinions of the constitutional 
justices. These legal opinions form the primary basis for the public's understanding of 
the current state of law. Writing opinion is also a key element of circuit court’s job. 
Hence, encouraging the writing of better opinions by rewarding those who produce high 
quality opinion is important. Thus, produce high quality opinion very useful in order to 
improve the quality of decisions.25 
 
7. Conclusion 
In order to make the Court as a qualified judiciary, not only the institutional aspects and 
patterns of judge recruitment that need to be considered, but also the decisions. For the 
verdict is the Crown of the judiciary. Therefore, the achievement and role of the 
Constitutional Court as a judicial institution in coloring the reform of law and 
constitution in the country is reflected in its decisions. In deciding a case, the 
Constitutional Court often applies a progressive legal paradigm that emphasizes the 
importance of substantive justice rather than procedural justice. This also implies that 
the judgment of a court is not necessarily bound to be in absolute legalistic formalism, 
but must also reach one of its main objectives, namely the fulfillment of justice values 
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